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ELECTING THE LEVIATHAN 
JAY MIKELMAN 
ABSTRACT  
Thomas Hobbes is equally famous for his description of society without government 
being a perpetual war and his insistence that said war can be avoided if individuals come 
together and agree to create and obey a government.  Unfortunately for Hobbes, the 
solution is not as simple as he portrays it to be.  One problem is that Hobbes fails to 
explain how individuals will choose who will be a part of the newly created government.  
Without a compelling answer to this question, Hobbes cannot describe how individuals 
escape the perpetual violence and enter into a State.  This thesis is an attempt to provide a 
sufficiently compelling answer to this problem.  Though this problem has been addressed 
by other scholars including Jean Hampton and Peter Vanderschraaf, this thesis differs 
from previous inquiries by focusing on the role that the qualifications of candidates for 
sovereign play in an agreement being reached. 
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Electing the Hobbesian Sovereign 
Thomas Hobbes’ “state of nature” thought experiment is one of the most well-known 
writings in the history of philosophy.  It begins with the entire (adult) population of a 
country in a pre-political condition, existing independently from one another (DC, VIII, 
1).1,2  Hobbes argues that such a scenario would result in individuals leading lives that 
were “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (L, XIII, 9)3 and that the state of affairs 
would, at least initially, be “no place for industry… [and there would be] no culture of the 
earth, no navigation…no commodious building, [and] no instruments of moving and 
removing such things as require much force” amongst other absences (ibid).  Hobbes 
concludes that individuals who began in this condition would eventually create a State, or 
“commonwealth,” either through force or agreement (L, XVII, 15).  The former method, 
“commonwealth by acquisition,” occurs when individuals separately agree to obey a 
single individual or group, “the sovereign,” usually under threat of death (L, XX, 1).  The 
latter method, “commonwealth by institution,” involves all members of the state of nature 
coming together and agreeing to be ruled by a sovereign of their own choosing (L, XVIII, 
                                                             
1 Hobbes (1998).  Future citations to this work will take the form (DC, I, 1), which represents De Cive, 
chapter 1, paragraph 1. 
2 For an understanding of the state of nature as an actual state of affairs see Hoekstra.  However, Hoekstra’s 
hypothesis is not necessarily contradictory to my understanding since the state of nature could have more 
than one meaning in Hobbes’ philosophy. My interpretation of the state of nature is that it is meant to 
provide philosophical knowledge of the state rather than a justification for the coercive nature of the state.  
For this division, and the acceptability of both interpretations, see Rawls (2007) 30-35. 
3 Hobbes (1994b).  Future citations to this work will take the form (L, I, 1), which represents Leviathan, 
chapter 1, paragraph 1. 
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1).  This agreement later became known as the “social contract” and has been used as a 
device by political philosophers throughout history and up to the present day.4     
Despite its profound historical impact, Hobbes’ description of the social contract 
is remarkably brief.  In Leviathan, Hobbes’ most famous (and longest) political text, the 
details of the agreement between future subjects is sparse, taking up roughly two 
paragraphs of the entire work, with those paragraphs separated by nearly an entire 
chapter.  In this essay I focus on only one of the several lacunae that results from Hobbes’ 
brevity: the question of how individuals instituting a monarch can agree to whom power 
will be granted, or what I will call “the monarch-selection problem.”  After a discussion 
of Hobbesian psychology and the state of nature, I introduce the text of the social contract 
and draw attention to Hobbes’ omission.  Next, I present and criticize Jean Hampton’s 
solution to the monarch-selection problem, where she suggests that leaders could be 
chosen through a series of elections.  Voters, Hampton argues, would endorse candidates 
(i) to whom they would want to be subjected and (ii) who had a chance at victory.  I 
argue that this first criterion is ambiguous between who voters would believe could best 
govern the state versus who they believe would provide benefits to their supporters.  I 
endorse the former interpretation as it is better able to capture the benefits that an election 
provides over alternative proposals such as a lottery.  Doing so requires arguing that 
Hobbes held what I call the “sovereign qualification thesis” – i.e. the qualifications of the 
                                                             
4 For some examples of the uses of the social contract in the history of political philosophy see Locke, 
Rousseau, Rawls (1971), and Gauthier. 
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individual(s) who possess(es) sovereign power is relevant to the stability of the 
commonwealth.5 
Part I 
  
Some background of Hobbes’ project is required before initiating an in-depth 
investigation of the Hobbesian social contract.  In the introduction to Leviathan, Hobbes 
compares the State to an artificial person.  Just as a human has a soul, joints, nerves, and 
memory, the State has parts that serve the analogous functions.  The “sovereign” or 
government serves as the soul, judges and police officers as the joints, reward and 
punishment as the nerves, and advisors as the memory (L, Intro, I).  Though the analogy 
itself has drawn significant scholarly interest,6 Hobbes’ utilization of the comparison is 
perhaps more interesting.  Once he has claimed that the State is an artificial human, he 
can treat it as any other artificial object.  For Hobbes, this meant that he could apply the 
resolutive-compositive method to the State.7 
The resolutive-compositive method consists in deconstructing an object into its 
composite parts and then rebuilding the object in order to gain knowledge about the 
                                                             
5 My interpretative methodology is one of rational reconstruction.  The idea is to take the meaning of the 
text at “face value” so far as is possible.  When vagueness, an ambiguity, or a lacuna exists in the text that 
cannot easily be eliminated by the immediately surrounding text the idea is to make it consistent with the 
rest of Hobbes’ work to the extent that the task can be accomplished.  Unsurprisingly, Hobbes fails to be 
entirely consistent and I attempt to point out some of the more obvious inconsistencies and put towards 
other scholars who thoroughly defend my chosen interpretation.  Other interpretative methodologies 
involve turning to the intellectual debates of Hobbes’ time to resolve textual questions or to value 
philosophic plausibility over the plain meaning of the text.  For an explanation and justification of the 
former see Skinner (2002a), especially chapter 6.  For an application of Skinner’s methodology to Hobbes 
see Skinner (2002b).  For a defense of the latter method see Kavka 3-4. 
6 For just one example see Tukiainen. 
7 For a detailed study of Hobbes’ use of the resolutive-compositive method see Watkins.  Other examples 
of scholars citing Hobbes’ method include Peters 158-59, Kavka 18-9, and Hampton 7.  Though the 
comparison of the State to a human being is most explicit in Leviathan and therefore the inspiration using 
the resolutive-compositive method clearest, it is also utilized in Hobbes’ earlier works. 
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original object.  Hobbes’ example of a watch provides a useful starting point for 
understanding the method (DC, Preface, 9).  One is able to learn about the watch as a 
whole and the interaction of the springs and cogs that allow the watch to operate by 
breaking down the watch to its part and making it functional again.  One is also able learn 
improper relations of the parts.  If one puts the watch together in such a way that it does 
not keep time then one has identified an improper organization of watches.  If the State, 
like the watch, is an object of artifice then one can apply the same methodology.8  
For political philosophy, utilizing the resolutive-compositive method meant 
breaking down the State into its most basic components in order to gain knowledge about 
the State.9  However, unlike the application of the method to watches,10 Hobbes could not 
literally deconstruct an actual State.  Rather, he would have to rely on his now famous 
“state of nature” thought experiment to apply the resolutive-compositive method to 
political philosophy (DC, Preface, 10).  In identifying the basic parts of the State, Hobbes 
selected human beings rather than the hierarchical relationships used by Aristotle.11  
However, human beings can be described in a myriad of ways and Hobbes had to select 
the particular attributes on which he wanted to focus.  Since he was attempting to create a 
theory applicable to all States, rather than merely a particular State or the ideal State, the 
attributes of humans that he identified had to be ones that were prevalent across various 
                                                             
8 It would be difficult to imagine Hobbes applying the same method if he analogized the State to a natural 
(rather than artificial) person since he denies that humans have a summum bonum (L, XI, 1). 
9 Gaining knowledge about the State is the theoretical aim of Leviathan.  Possible practical aims of 
Leviathan include producing a text that could be taught in universities, influence readers, guide sovereigns, 
or have an extended influence beyond even those who would ever read the text.  For a useful summary of 
these views and an argument in favor of the final one see Vaughan. 
10 For a fantastic application of the resolutive-compositive method to watches see “How Watches Work.” 
11 Aristotle, 36. 
5 
 
 
 
populations and societies.12  Additionally, since one of his aims was to show that human 
beings were not naturally social creatures,13 Hobbes was charged with eliminating the 
attributes of humans that were a direct result of societal interaction.   
Hobbesian Psychology 
What features would people possess absent society?  It is important to remember 
that in spite of the theoretical nature of the experiment, Hobbes was attempting to 
approximate actual human behavior in the fictional scenario.14  He was aiming to 
reproduce the resolutive-compositive method as best he could without actually 
possessing the ability to deconstruct a State.  Therefore, I will understand Hobbesian 
individuals in such a way that their properties do not blatantly contradict either Hobbes’ 
statements about people or everyday common experience.15 
I will start with the psychological claims that Hobbes believes apply to all 
(normal) human beings.16  First, to avoid a common misconception, I want to deny that 
Hobbes was a psychological egoist.17  Rather, the most specific universal psychological 
claim that Hobbes provides is that all individuals act in order to satisfy their own 
                                                             
12 C.B. Macpherson famously has accused Hobbes of failing at this goal by imparting traits obtained from 
being a member of a free market society onto state of nature individuals. See especially 46-70. 
13 L, XVII, 6-12. 
14 Hobbes cites Native Americans and the relations that hold between countries as two approximations of 
the state of nature (L, XIII, 11). 
15 For the importance of introspection to Hobbes’ theory of emotion see the introduction to Leviathan and 
Gert, especially 503-4. 
16 Hobbes makes clear that his theory is not totally inclusive and therefore Hobbesian individuals need not 
apply to all individuals.  Just “as a church, an hospital, [or] a bridge” cannot authorize the sovereign (L, 
XVI, 9) “[l]ikewise, children, fools, and madmen that have no use of reason may be personated by 
guardians or curators, but can be no authors…” (L, XVI, 10).   
17 Though Hobbes is often taken to be a psychological egoist, this is not the case if we understand egoism 
to mean that individuals never act to benefit others or to do what they believe to be morally right (Gert, p. 
512). For an example of the traditional understanding of Hobbes as an egoist see Nagel, 69. 
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desires.18  However, this principle by itself does not tell us what desires people have and 
therefore does not speak either for or against psychological egoism.  In fact, he does not 
require that these desires be self-regarding and refers multiple times to individuals acting 
out of the desire to help others or to do what is right.19  Though Hobbes’ claim that 
individuals act in order to satisfy their own desires does not get us very far without 
knowing what people desire, Hobbes does discuss prevalent, non-universal characteristics 
that provide greater insight into how the state of nature would unfold.  These 
characteristics, though not universal, are sufficiently displayed in large populations that 
they have an effect on the events in the state of nature and therefore are relevant when 
learning about the State. The characteristics that make up what I will “Hobbesian 
individuals” are20: 
Limited benevolence: Most people, most of the time, are primarily concerned with 
their own well-being. Also very few, if any, people are ever concerned with the 
well-being of everybody. 
Death-aversion: Almost all individuals are strongly averse to their own death and 
generally do not act in ways that threaten their self-preservation. 
Glory-seeking: Many individuals strongly desire to be well-regarded by others. 
Materialistic: Many individuals have a strong desire for material goods for their 
own sake. 
Liberty lovers: Individuals prefer to rule themselves rather than be subject to the 
authority of others. 
Means gatherers: Individuals not only desire certain ends (e.g. continued life, 
glory, material goods, and/or liberty), but also the means to those ends. 
 
Again, not every person in the state of nature will possess every one of these features, but 
rather each feature will be prominently exhibited amongst the total population. Hobbesian 
                                                             
18 Gert, p. 507. 
19 In Leviathan Hobbes cites one’s duty to God as “the most frequent praetext of sedition and civil war” 
(cited in Lloyd 37). 
20 This list is adapted from one provided by Gregory Kavka (33), but contains important differences 
including, but not limited to, the inclusion of individuals desiring material goods for their own sake.  
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psychology also does not dictate that individuals will seek to maximize their well-being, 
but only that their voluntary actions are driven by some desired good.21  Therefore, even 
if all individuals desire their own self-preservation more than all other things combined, 
this would not entail that individuals act only out of a desire for continued life.22   
Initial State of Nature  
Now that we have described Hobbesian individuals, the building blocks of the 
State, we can begin to conceive of how they come together to create a State.  Hobbes’ 
clearest statement on the starting point of the resolutive-compositive method comes from 
De Cive.  He says, "To return once again to the natural state and to look at men as if they 
had just emerged from the earth like mushrooms and grown up without any obligation to 
each other…” (DC, VIII, 1).23 Though Hobbes merely calls for the cessation of obligation 
to others, since the resolutive-compositive method involves disassembling the State (only 
to later reconstitute it) I will interpret the claim to also mean that individuals begin in 
physical isolation from one another.  Therefore, our starting point for the state of nature 
thought experiment is a group of individuals, roughly the population of a State,24 many of 
                                                             
21 For an argument on the implausibility of “maximizing egoism” see Kavka, 38-9. Hobbes occasionally 
does suggest that individuals act only according to what they believe best overall for themselves (L, XIV, 
8). 
22 For a discussion and repudiation of the view that Hobbes’ held individuals to always be driven by fear of 
death see Sreedhar (2010) 32-8. 
23 This is distinct from the common definition that Hobbes gives for the state of nature as merely being any 
state of affairs when there is no “common power” (L, XIII, 8; L, XVII, 2).  Again, I suspect that this 
broader definition is related to other possible functions that the state of nature thought experiment can be 
used to serve.  See footnote 2. 
24 It is important for the resolutive-compositive method that the state of nature resemble as close as possibly 
the component parts of a State.  Given that there is no a priori reason to shrink (or enlarge) the population I 
will assume that we are dealing with a roughly State-size population of individuals. 
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whom desire self-preservation, glory, material goods, and/or liberty, existing in isolation 
from one another with no coercive power over them. 
Hobbes famously claims that in the state of nature all individuals are equal to each 
other (L, XIII, 1).  However, the equality to which Hobbes is referring is a narrow 
concept.  He only means that no individual is so mentally and physically superior to all 
others that she can conquer everybody without any help (L, XIII, 2).  This leaves 
significant room for variation between individuals.  One way in which people can differ, 
and that I have already mentioned, is their desires.  Hobbesian individuals may not only 
possess different desires (L, VI, 6) – e.g. one individual may desire material goods 
whereas another may not – but also have varying strengths of the same desire (L, VIII, 
15) – e.g. one individual may strongly desire material goods whereas another individual 
only has a weak inclination towards them – and there may be different state of affairs that 
will satisfy their desires (L, Intro, 3) – e.g. one individual’s desire for material goods may 
be satisfied by a large shelter whereas another could be satisfied by a shiny rock.  
However, varying desires are not the only way that Hobbesian individuals are different 
from one another.  People also differ in physical strength, experiential knowledge 
(“prudence”), and theoretical knowledge (“science”) (DC, I, 1).25   
Despite the fact that nearly every individual desires self-preservation and, 
consequently, food, drink, and shelter, differences between individuals can lead to 
different choices and variable experiences in the state of nature.  For example, individuals 
                                                             
25 Differences in experiential and theoretical knowledge would not be present at the onset of the state of 
nature.  However, differences in experiential knowledge would quickly appear due to the varying activities 
in which individuals participated.  Though Hobbes is clear that we are not born with theoretical knowledge 
(L, XIII, 2), it is less clear whether it can be gained in the state of nature (L, XIII, 2; L, XIII, 9). 
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will find diverse ways of striving for self-preservation: an individual with experiential 
knowledge of woodcraft will be able to fashion weapons out of trees, somebody with 
theoretical knowledge of chemistry may be able to concoct a poison, and a person with 
physical strength will better be able to battle in hand-to-hand combat.  Differences in 
individuals will lead to different methods of desire fulfillment and thus different 
experiences in the state of nature.   
In addition to the importance that individuals’ knowledge (true beliefs) play in 
their behavior in the state of nature, false beliefs will also play an important role.26  For 
example, a knowledgeable scavenger attempting to fulfill her desire for nourishment (for 
the purpose of self-preservation) will avoid poisonous mushrooms whereas an ignorant 
scavenger will not.  Though both may fulfill their immediate desire for nourishment, only 
the former will have been successful achieving her more basic desire for self-
preservation.  
Given Hobbesian psychology, how does Hobbes predict individuals will behave 
at the onset of the state of nature?  The picture of the isolated individual with which the 
state of nature begins will not hold for long.  Mutual desire for limited natural resources 
(needed for self-preservation or material gain) leads to conflict (L, XIII, 3).  At the same 
time, glory-seekers will attempt to forcibly extort signs of praise from others (L, XIII, 7).  
Ultimately, even those who would rather keep to themselves will end up on the offensive 
in an attempt to protect themselves from those seeking natural resources or glory (L, XIII, 
                                                             
26 Though Hobbes often implies that prudence is equivalent to experience (L, III, 7), he also claims that 
experience only imparts prudence if the “observations be such as are not easy or usual…” (L, VIII, 11).  
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4).  It is in this way that a set of isolated individuals can lead to a series of competitive, 
often violent interactions, or what Hobbes refers to as the “state of war.”27 
“Advanced” State of Nature28   
Hobbes often writes as if commonwealths are created immediately after this series 
of individual battles.29  However, Hobbes does not clearly identify the time at which the 
social contract is agreed to and there is significant textual evidence to indicate that the 
state of nature does not immediately follow this initial series of tussles.  For example, 
Hobbes refers to families (L, XX, 4; DC, VIII, 1), confederacies (L, XIII, 1), united 
forces (L, XIII, 3), and master-servant relationships (L, XIII, 4) all existing in the state of 
nature.30  I will call the period during which Hobbesian individuals remain in the state of 
nature, but are involved in group activity, the “advanced” state of nature.  
The advanced state of nature is differentiated from the initial state of nature by the 
presence of cooperative groups.31  At the onset of the state of nature thought experiment 
Hobbesian individuals lead isolated, dangerous, and uncertain lives.  Given that this 
jeopardizes the fulfillment of their desires for self-preservation and material goods, 
individuals will seek out an alternative to these competitive, individualistic interactions 
                                                             
27 The state of war is not necessarily marred by constant violence, but rather “a tract of time wherein the 
will to contend by battle is sufficiently known” (L, XIII, 8). 
28  For use of this term see Sreedhar (2012) 261. 
29 For example, he denies dominion in the state of nature and claims that justice and injustice do not exist in 
the state of nature, but rather “are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude” (L, XIII, 13).   
30 There are also some practical considerations that suggest Hobbes would prefer an elongated state of 
nature.  After all, an immediately escapable state of nature is not merely as foreboding as one that must be 
mired through (see footnote 9). 
31 There is no clear demarcation between the initial and advanced state of nature.  For example, Hobbes 
discusses the creation of groups to attack stronger foes twice (L, XIII, 1; L, XIII, 3) before mentioning the 
role glory plays in making the state of nature a state of war (L, XIII, 5).  In fact, it would seem that the 
possibility of group activity is central to Hobbes’ claim of physical equality (L, XIII, 1).  I introduce the 
stages only for clarity and their distinctness is not necessary for my paper.  
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and instead turn to hierarchical and non-hierarchical cooperative interactions.  There are 
several forms these interactions can take.  They can either be simultaneous activities, 
where all participants perform an act at the same time, or staggered activities, where 
some participants perform before others.  They can also be designed to persist over the 
relatively short-term or long-term.  An example of a short-term, simultaneous, 
cooperative activity is when a group of individuals band together to take the goods of 
some unaffiliated individual by force.  A long-term, simultaneous activity would be 
individuals joining together to take the goods of others indefinitely.   A short-term, 
staggered cooperative activity is when I agree to trade you some of my excess water 
today for some of your excess food tomorrow.  A long-term, staggered cooperative 
activity would be where I agree to always trade you my excess water on Mondays for 
your excess food on Fridays. 
Non-hierarchical, cooperative interactions possess the potential for substantial 
benefits to the participants: Attempting to forcibly seize goods from an individual has a 
much larger chance of success when one is in a group rather than acting alone.  Trading a 
surplus of one good for a necessary good that one lacks allows one to procure that 
necessary good more efficiently.  Unfortunately these benefits are bound to go unrealized 
in the state of nature, since Hobbes holds that the only non-hierarchical, cooperative 
interactions that have the possibility of success are short-term, simultaneous activities.  
Long-term, simultaneous activities will break down either through disagreement or greed 
(L, XVII, 4).  Members may disagree about whom to attack next or how to divide the 
spoils of a previous attack.  In the face of disagreement the group has three possibilities; 
12 
 
 
 
let the disagreement go unresolved, resolve the disagreement through violence, or set up 
an arbitrator to resolve the disagreement (L, V, 3).  The first two would sap the group of 
any potential benefits and the third would transform the group, at least temporarily, from 
non-hierarchical to hierarchical.  Additionally, a member’s desire for material goods or 
glory may get the better of her by leading her to attack another member of the group for 
her possessions.  Short-term, staggered, cooperative activities are unlikely to even be 
attempted in the state of nature because whoever performs first has no assurance that the 
other individual(s) will perform their end of the bargain (L, XIV, 18).  What benefit 
would you receive from giving me food today if I already gave you water yesterday?  The 
inability to locate a compelling response will almost certainly stop an individual from 
sending over the water in the first place.  Though Hobbes does not speak directly to long-
term, staggered cooperation, we can surmise that it too would have difficulty getting off 
the ground.  The uncertainty of production, not to mention continued existence, in the 
state of nature makes such arrangements implausible.  If I give you water on Monday, 
what is to say that you will not have all of your food taken from you, and perhaps even be 
killed or left to starve, by Friday?  Perhaps the intervals could be shortened, but at some 
point it simply becomes long-term, simultaneous cooperation and that possibility has 
already been dismissed as unachievable.  This leaves only short-term, simultaneous 
cooperation.  Hobbes’ references to killing the strongest individual in the state of nature 
via “confederacy” (L, XIII, 1) or coming together “with forces united” to dispossess an 
individual of their goods (L, XIII, 3) indicate that he believes such cooperative activities 
are possible.  However, the just cited examples demonstrate the problem with short-term, 
13 
 
 
 
non-hierarchical cooperative activities: They reap benefits through competition with 
other groups.  A state of affairs that relied solely on this form of cooperation would 
contain significant levels of violence, making non-hierarchical cooperative actions 
unsuitable for solving the misery of the state of nature. 
Hobbes is more optimistic about the possibility of hierarchical cooperative 
interactions in the state of nature.32  By hierarchical I mean that an individual or group 
has authority over one or more individuals – i.e. her or their commands are treated as 
exclusionary reasons for action.33  Hobbes not only recognizes the possibility of family 
units existing in the state of nature (L, XIII, 11), but he suggests that these relationships 
are comparatively stable and their existence is threatened not by internal group dynamics, 
but by external events due to their relatively small size (L, XVII, 2).34   
Another form of hierarchical cooperative interaction in the state of nature is that 
between a “master” and “servant.”  A master acquires authority over a servant when, at 
the end of a battle, “the vanquished, to avoid the present stroke of death, 
covenanteth…that so long as his life and the liberty of his body is allowed him, the victor 
shall have the use thereof, at his pleasure” (L, XX, 10).  The authority of the master is 
generated through an agreement that the master will allow the servant life and liberty (of 
                                                             
32 It may be thought that hierarchical cooperative interactions are impossible in the state of nature given 
that Hobbes often denies the possibility of contracts, obligations, and justice without a sovereign (L, XIV, 
18).  However, Hobbes also speaks of children being obligated to their mothers via contract outside of 
society (L, XX, 4).  Additionally, for my purposes it is not important that these be morally obligatory 
hierarchies and therefore the question of whether contracting is possible in the state of nature does not 
impact my claim. 
33 On attributing the Razian conception of authority to Hobbes see Sreedhar (2010) 108-119 and Courtland 
419–449. 
34 For an analysis on the importance of the family in the state of nature see Schochet.  At times Hobbes 
does indicate that children are indeed obligated to obey their parents even in the state of nature (L, XX, 5). 
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movement) in exchange for the goods and labor of the servant (L, XX, 13). 35  From the 
Hobbesian perspective this agreement benefits both sides because the conquered is able 
to avoid death while the conqueror is able to employ the goods and labor of the servant as 
a tool to better achieve her desired ends. 
The desire of the conquered for self-preservation only explains why she would 
agree to a master-servant relationship while a sword is held to her throat by her 
conqueror.  However, as Hobbes emphasizes, a servant (as opposed to a “slave”) is 
granted freedom of movement and therefore her life is not always under constant and 
immediate threat (L, XX, 10).  Why would the servant, once free from the threat of 
execution, choose to obey the master?  In some cases the answer is that she would not.  A 
servant constantly forced to put her life on the line with little prospect for gain would 
simply run away or attack the master the first chance afforded to her.36  Yet, a 
relationship where the master and servant unite their strength to battle single individuals 
or other groups could prove to be mutually beneficial.  Each individual would be more 
secure than she would be on her own and together they would have a much better chance 
of fulfilling their desires for preservation, material goods, and glory.  So long as the 
servant’s desire for self-rule does not drive her to rebellious action, the relationship can 
be mutually beneficial.  Masters who are able to command obedient servants also have a 
chance to expand their ranks.  Just as the master was able to gain authority over the 
                                                             
35 Again, my account is not committed to the possibility of morally obligatory contracts in the state of 
nature.  The only requirement is that it is psychologically plausible that both individuals would agree to the 
stated terms.   
36 Poor judgment on the part of the master could be caused either by a lack of knowledge or by a strong 
desire for glory. 
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servant by offering a choice between death and servitude, the master, with the assistance 
of her servant, may now be better positioned to force other individuals (or groups) to 
choose between death and servitude. Hobbesian psychology dictates that most would 
select that latter, since the desire for self-preservation is generally a motivating force for 
individuals.37  
Master-servant(s) groups, like families, are (at least potentially) internally stable, 
yet remain vulnerable to external violence.  This leaves members of these groups in the 
state of war, under the constant cloud of potential attack.  Since masters will be confident 
about their ability to defeat other individuals or groups, battle remains a fact of life.  
However, just as was true in in the initial state of nature, the state of war is contrary to the 
interests of all participants because their lack of security interferes with reaping the 
benefits of long-term cooperation.   
At this point Hobbes appears to have reached a dead end.  He was attempting to 
reconstruct the State from its component parts, human beings.  However, whether they 
act alone or in a group, the result is a state of war.  The level of cooperation necessary to 
create the State appears to be out of reach.38  As Hobbes admits, “[I]f there be no power 
erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will, and may lawfully rely on 
his own strength and art, for caution against all other men” (L, XVII, 2).  But if 
                                                             
37 For a description of a similar process, but resulting in a commonwealth by acquisition, see Hampton 166-
173. 
38 Of course, it would still be possible to create a commonwealth by acquisition.  However, to eliminate the 
possibility of commonwealth by institution would be to rob Hobbes of a powerful normative tool (Kavka 
181). 
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everybody relies on their “own strength and art,” the war of all against all will continue 
indefinitely and the State will never be reconstructed. 
Commonwealth by Institution 
The transition from the state of war to the institution of the State via the social 
contract has long puzzled scholars.39  At one minute individuals (and groups) are engaged 
in a war of all against all and the next they have peacefully joined together with the 
intention of “confer[ring] all their power and strength upon one man…” (L, XVII, 13).  It 
is certainly not a problem that I can adequately address in this work.  Rather, I will 
simply follow the text and assume that Hobbesian individuals do come together to create 
the State and that they do so because they are driven by the desires for self-preservation 
and material goods (along with the means thereunto) coupled with their belief that 
surrendering one’s rights is the only action capable of achieving these ends (L, XIII, 14; 
L, XVII, 1).40  They also do not mean to merely create a temporary solution to the state of 
war, but rather to introduce a lasting institution (L, XIX, 15; L, XXIX, 1).   
                                                             
39 This puzzlement can take either a broad or a narrow focus.  Examples of broad puzzlement include the 
question of how several individuals unite into one will (see Skinner [2007]), the monarch-selection 
problem, and the question of how the sovereign will have sufficient power to punish rebels immediately 
after being instituted (see Kavka, especially chapters 5 and 6 and Hampton, especially chapter 6).  The 
narrow puzzlement is over what change occurs that leads individuals to go from a war of all against all to 
sufficient cooperation to even begin negotiating the possibility of creating a commonwealth.  M.M. 
Goldsmith provides one example of the vague hand-waving that is often used to solve this problem: 
“Realizing that war frustrates their ability to achieve their desires, and, even worse, threatens their 
continued existence (the basic condition of having desires), men realize that, in order to preserve 
themselves, they must have peace” (Goldsmith, 131, my emphasis). 
40 It may be that the fact that these desires and beliefs are necessary for commonwealth by institution tells 
us something about the State.  This could explain why Hobbes so often mentions that “the business of a 
commonwealth is this, to preserve the people in peace at home and defend them against foreign 
invasion…” (L, XXV, 13).  My unofficial count has some mention of the commonwealth being for the 
purpose of peace at nineteen through chapter 27. 
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Though the desires for self-preservation and material goods and the belief that the 
commonwealth is the only means to permanently secure these goods are the driving force 
behind the creation of the State, they do not necessarily comprise the totality of desires 
and beliefs held by the “contractors” who have come together to institute the 
commonwealth.  After all, if that were the case it would mean that the Hobbesian 
individuals who participated in the initial and advanced state of nature, gaining 
experiential knowledge along the way, had been simply replaced by different people 
contrary to the resolutive-compositive method.  Rather, I will assume that (some) 
Hobbesian individuals have only undergone a slight alteration in their psychological 
make-up.  Whereas previously all or nearly all individuals desired self-preservation, but 
sometimes were led to a contrary action due to another desire, now all individuals will be 
constrained by their desire for self-preservation.41  This does not eliminate their desires 
for glory, material goods, liberty, or anything else, but only means that those desires will 
not lead them to act in a way that jeopardizes their life. 
While all being driven to pursue self-preservation via instituting a 
commonwealth, Hobbesian individuals will come together possessing different 
knowledge from each other.   They will have gained knowledge through their different 
experiences that preceded their joining together: They would have some idea of various 
forms of social associations (e.g. hierarchical vs. non-hierarchical leadership structure), 
as well as knowledge about those individuals with whom they interacted.  Any one 
individual’s group of acquaintances would presumably be well short of the entire state of 
                                                             
41 Hobbes leaves open the possibility that some individuals do not undergo this transformation and are left 
out of the formation of the commonwealth (L, XV, 5).   
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nature population, but it would include those who they ruled, those under whom they 
served, those with whom they traded, and those against whom they fought.  This means 
that every contractor will come to the instituting of the commonwealth with the same 
motivations, but different knowledge.  The implications of this conclusion will become 
clear as we attempt to solve the monarch-selection problem.42 
Unfortunately, the universal desire to create a State is not sufficient to explain the 
process of instituting a commonwealth.  Several details of the process cannot be derived 
from this shared desire.  To what specific institutions would contractors agree?  If they 
could not agree then how would disagreements be resolved?  Specific questions include: 
How would contractors determine whether the sovereign would be a monarchy (rule by 
one), aristocracy (rule by some), or democracy (rule by all)?  If creating an aristocracy or 
monarchy, how would they choose which individual or individuals would have decision-
making power and which would not?  I will attempt to answer the last of these questions 
while assuming that contractors choose to institute a monarchy.  There are several 
reasons for this narrow concentration: it is Hampton’s focus in addressing what she calls 
the “leadership-selection problem” 43 and Hobbes favored monarchy over aristocracy and 
democracy (L, XIX, 4).  However, most importantly for my aim is that creating a 
monarchy via institution is especially challenging, for reasons that I will explain below.  
Therefore, if a viable solution can be identified, providing answers for the other forms 
should not be too difficult. 
                                                             
42 For a different interpretation of the knowledge and beliefs of the contractors see Kavka 188-200. 
43 Hampton 150. 
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In order to explain the difficulty of creating a monarchy by institution I must first 
spell out in detail how a commonwealth by institution is created.  In Leviathan, Hobbes 
limits his description of the process to two passages.  First, he says:   
The only way to erect such a common power as may be able to defend them 
[those in the state of nature] from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of 
one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own industry, 
and by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is 
to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of 
men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will, which is 
as much to say, to appoint one man or assembly of men to bear their person, and 
every one to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so 
beareth their person shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern 
the common peace and safety, and therein to submit their wills, every one to his 
will, and their judgments to his judgment.  This is more than consent, or concord; 
it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of 
every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every 
man I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this 
assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and 
authorize all his actions in like manner (L, XVII, 13). 
 
In this passage Hobbes mentions three steps that are required to institute a 
commonwealth – election, covenant, and authorization.  However, he fails to provide 
many specifics including, but not limited to, the order in which the steps are carried out.  
Fortunately, in a later passage Hobbes re-states the process of institution in a way that 
provides more insight: 
A commonwealth is said to be instituted, when a multitude of men do agree and 
covenant, every one with every one, that to whatsoever man or assembly of men 
shall be given by the major part the right to present the person of them all (that is 
to say, to be their representative) every one, as well as he that voted for it as he 
that voted against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgments of that man or 
assembly of men, in the same manner as if they were his own, to the end, to live 
peaceably amongst themselves and be protected against other men (L, XVIII, 1). 
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This passage suggests that commonwealth by institution proceeds in a step-wise fashion.  
The first step is an agreement between all of the contractors to authorize whichever 
individual (or assembly) receives the majority of support.  The second step is to carry out 
the process of voting to determine who (or what) will be authorized.  The process ends 
with all individuals authorizing whoever (or whatever) emerged as the victor of the 
voting process. 44  
 If we know the three-step process for instituting a commonwealth, then why 
should we think that there will be difficulty in creating a monarchy by institution?   One 
issue, the monarch-selection problem, is that the second step is underdescribed.  
Assuming that every individual entering the commonwealth is a candidate for sovereign 
then it is extremely difficult to envision, as I show below, that a single individual will 
initially receive the majority of votes for the post.  Unless Hobbes can explain how the 
candidate pool is narrowed down to a single individual, thus ensuring a candidate 
receives majority support,45 the description of commonwealth by institution fails to be 
complete. 
 Hobbes’ failure to explain the details that result in authorization of the sovereign 
in Leviathan can perhaps be remedied by reference to his explication of commonwealth 
by institution in earlier political works.  In De Cive Hobbes specifies, “Here too the 
implication is that one specific man who is distinguished from all the rest by his name or 
                                                             
44 For a similar understanding of the passage see Vanderschraaf 385. 
45 Narrowing the field to one candidate would not, a priori, entail majority support since voters could 
withhold their support by either voting “no” or not voting depending on the precise procedure.  However, 
given Hobbesian psychology we can safely conclude that individuals would support a candidate when she 
was the only possibility for sovereign since the choice faced would be either to live in a commonwealth 
with that individual as sovereign or live in the state of nature.  For a similar argument see Hampton 163-
164. 
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some other mark, is put forward, and the whole right of the people is transferred to him 
by a majority of votes…” (DC, VII, 11).46  Though Hobbes alters the final step by 
replacing the transfer of rights present in De Cive with authorization in Leviathan, there 
is no reason that the solution to the monarch-selection problem should change between 
works.47  However, the further description in De Cive is merely a recognition of the 
problem, rather than a solution to it: Hobbes specifies that the individual who is to be 
elected is picked out by her “name or some other mark,” a description that could identify 
an almost infinite list of properties. 
 The state of nature begins with individuals in isolation, quickly leading to a battle 
for goods and glory, hierarchical and non-hierarchical group formation, and eventually 
the coming together of individuals to institute a commonwealth.  Individuals who agree 
to create a monarchy are faced with the problem of what particular person to empower.  
In Leviathan Hobbes suggests that whoever is empowered will first require the 
procurement of a majority of votes, but fails to provide further detail.  In De Cive, 
Hobbes tells us that the individual put forth “is distinguished from all the rest by his name 
or some other mark.”  The purported solution fails to solve the problem and we are left 
without a satisfactory answer to the monarch-selection problem.      
Part II 
 
                                                             
46 The corresponding passage in the Elements of Law reads, “Out of the same democracy, the institution of 
a political monarch proceedeth in the same manner, (viz.) by a decree of the sovereign people, to pass the 
sovereignty to one man named, and approved by plurality of suffrage” (Hobbes (1994a) 121). 
47 For arguments that Hobbes abandons democratic procedures in Leviathan see Baumgold 42-43 and 
Sommerville 59. 
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Jean Hampton was perhaps the first scholar who attempted to solve the monarch-
selection problem.48  Hampton proposes a series of successive elections as a “possible 
and natural” process for Hobbesian individuals to employ in order to identify a single 
individual to reign.  The elections are meant to whittle down the field of candidates from 
everybody in the state of nature to a single person:  After an initial ballot in which every 
individual voted for him or herself, some individuals would vote for somebody else on 
the second ballot.  Voters would continue to shift their support in subsequent rounds until 
a single individual received a majority of the vote.49  
I am not concerned with the question of who would shift their vote from his or 
herself to another candidate, thus giving up hope for self-rule, but rather to whom those 
people’s votes would shift.50  Hampton explains that those who vote for somebody else 
“would find it rational to vote for…someone to whom they would prefer being 
subjugated and who also would have a reasonable chance of being elected.”51  The two 
criteria provided by Hampton are “worth”52 – the candidate is somebody to whom the 
voter would want to be subjugated – and “electability” – the recipient is somebody the 
voter reasonably believes has a chance to become sovereign.   
                                                             
48 Hampton 150-166. 
49 Hampton explicitly mirrors the primary system of American elections (161). 
50 Hampton argues that unsuccessful individuals in the state of nature would be quicker to shift their vote 
since they faced greater danger upon a return to the state of war (Hampton 163).  However, given the 
possibility of entering a master-servant relationship discussed in part I of this paper it is unclear whether 
Hampton correctly identifies those who would shift their vote since even “unsuccessful” individuals could 
find safety in hierarchical relationships. 
51 Hampton 163. 
52 “The value or worth of a man is, as of all other things, his price that is to say, so much as would be given 
for the use of his power; and there is not absolute, but a thing dependent on the need and judgment of 
another” (L, X, 16, my emphasis). 
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Though Hampton does not provide detail about how voters would weigh trade-
offs between these two criteria, I believe we can at least provide some guidelines for how 
people would vote.  In order of preference, a voter would endorse a candidate who 
possesses: 
1) Worth and electability 
2) Electability, but not worth 
3) Worth, but not electability 
4) Neither worth nor electability 
 
First, it should be noted that this ranking does not determine how voters would rank 
various candidates who possessed various degrees of both worth and electability.  Such 
choices are simply too fine-grained for the Hobbesian psychology I have outlined.  
However, the rankings do show that voters would endorse a candidate with electability 
(but not worth) over a candidate with worth (but not electability).  This is because voters 
would prefer to be subjugated to anybody at all rather than endorsing a candidate that 
they like but failing to agree on a sovereign to authorize and remaining in a state of war.  
However, worth can still be the determining factor in selecting a candidate when voters 
have no knowledge about electability or they believe all candidates to be equally 
electable.  When voters do rely solely on worth, what exactly are they looking for in a 
candidate?  On this question Hampton is surprisingly silent.53   
The most obvious reason to prefer an individual as subjugator is that the voter 
believes that individual to be the most qualified for the position.  The voter is attempting 
to create a commonwealth that is indestructible from “internal causes” (L, XXIX, 1) – i.e. 
                                                             
53 This is especially perplexing given that Hampton earlier states that an individual’s preference is for self-
rule over other-rule, but fails to even suggest that one would draw distinctions between the other in other-
rule (Hampton, 151). 
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everything except natural disasters and foreign forces – and, given her desires for peace 
and the means to achieve it, she would aim to subject herself to the person who she 
believes most able for the task.  However, several scholars claim that Hobbes held that a 
sovereign’s qualifications do not significantly affect the peace of the commonwealth, 
denying what I earlier designated the “sovereign qualification thesis.”  Rejecting this 
thesis means, despite the intuitive appeal, that voters do not need to pay attention to the 
qualifications of potential sovereigns since these qualifications do not bare on whether 
there will be a peaceful commonwealth.  
Richard Peters states his opposition to the sovereign qualification thesis clearly 
when he says that Hobbes: 
…thought that institutional control rather than the breeding and training of a 
ruling class of philosophical shamans was the only effective safeguard against the 
depravity of man…. His case against democracy was that it was less likely than 
monarchy to avert the ultimate disaster.  He was very conscious of the 
inconveniences of monarchy and paid scant attention to the character and training 
of the monarch.  Sovereignty was for Hobbes an office.  He assumed that anyone 
who occupied it would be no better and no worse than anyone else.54 
 
Comparing the questions who should rule and whether the sovereign should be a 
monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy is illustrative.  As Peters notes, Hobbes makes clear 
that he believes monarchy is the least likely of the three forms to devolve into civil war.  
In the final sentence quoted, Peters denies that Hobbes held an analogous position with 
regard to who should rule – i.e. Hobbes believed all candidates would be equally effective 
monarchs.  
Richard Tuck appears to hold a position consistent with Peters’ when he says: 
                                                             
54 Peters 223. 
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So the only question Hobbes thought worth asking [for the Foole] was, suppose I 
could seize the sovereignty, would I not be better off in terms of my survival than 
if I remained an obedient citizen?  And the answer he gave was then 
straightforward, which was that there is no benefit from being the sovereign rather 
than a citizen, and there is a greater risk of destruction if one embarks on treason 
rather than loyally obeying the laws.  There is no advantage in being the 
sovereign rather than a citizen, because it does not matter (on Hobbes’s theory) 
who makes the judgments about our preservation, as long as we all make the same 
judgments – I should not think that there is anything special about their being my 
judgments rather than someone else’s, since all judgments (in contentious 
matters) are equally ill-founded.55   
 
Tuck’s position is that it does not matter for the stability of the commonwealth who 
makes the decisions or what decisions are made, but only that all citizens abide by the 
decisions of the sovereign, no matter who that happens to be.56 
The previously quoted passages from Peters and Tuck suggest that at least some 
scholars deny the sovereign qualification thesis.  Russell Hardin applies the denial of this 
position to the monarch-selection problem.  He reasons that:  
Since we are all relatively equal in any sense that matters, many of us would be 
plausible candidates for sovereignty, so our coordination problem is a 
complicated one.  But it is also therefore a relatively simple one in that it hardly 
matters whom we finally get as our sovereign. What matters is that we finally 
succeed in coordinating…. We cannot select from simple reason - there is none - 
but only from arbitrary will.57   
 
Hardin explains that if we are sufficiently equal in our ability to rule (a position that 
Hardin attributes to Hobbes), then we should conclude that there is no better or worse 
answer to the question of who should rule.   
                                                             
55 Tuck (1991) XXXI. 
56 In other work Tuck seems to accept that sovereign’s can err, but never discusses how this relates to his 
understanding of other parts of Hobbes’ work.  See Tuck (1989) 76.  For an understanding of Tuck’s 
interpretations that matches mine see Abizadeh 307. 
57 Hardin 169. 
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Hobbes provides explicit textual evidence for the position attributed to him by 
Peters, Tuck, and Hardin in the dedication letter to Leviathan: “Besides, I speak not of the 
men, but (in the abstract) of the seat of power (like to those simple and unpartial creatures 
in the Roman Capitol, that with their noise defended those within it, not because they 
were they, but there)” (Letter Dedicatory, p. 2).   Hobbes claims that he is not concerned 
with the particular individuals who hold sovereign power, but with sovereignty itself.   
One way to maintain focus on sovereignty (rather than the sovereign) would be to 
create a theory that denies the sovereign qualification thesis.  A natural reading of 
Leviathan suggests that Hobbes does just this.  The argument is, roughly, as follows:   
1) All (de jure) sovereigns possess absolute rights in matters pertaining to the peace 
of the commonwealth (L, XVIII).   
2) The private interest of a monarch dovetails with the public interest of the 
commonwealth (L, XIX, 4).   
3) Individuals act in their self-interest (L, VI, 49).   
 
These three premises only tell us that all individuals have the right and desire to maintain 
a peaceful commonwealth.  A final assumption is needed to conclude that sovereigns are 
equally good at achieving this peace.  The argument continues: 
4) All individuals are equally effective at fulfilling their desires. 
 
From these four premises we conclude that: 
5) Any individual who was monarch would act in the interest of the commonwealth 
to the same degree as any other individual in that position. 
 
This sketch shows that there is at least plausibility to the claim that Hobbes denied that 
the qualifications of the sovereign are relevant to the peace of the commonwealth. 
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The denial of the sovereign qualification thesis - attributed to Hobbes by Peters, 
Tuck, and Hardin - leads to the conclusion that one’s worth cannot be determined by 
one’s perceived ability to successfully govern.  Unable to vote for the candidate whom 
they believe will best run the commonwealth, voters will have to employ alternative 
criteria when selecting a sovereign.  Individuals would plausibly use the criterion of 
maximizing their personal self-interest – i.e. their particular self-preservation, glory, 
material goods, and/or freedom – in deciding for whom to vote.58  I say “personal self-
interest” to mark something narrower than self-interest in general.  As I noted earlier, the 
creation of (an everlasting) commonwealth is in the general self-interest of individuals.  
Not only that, but these gains of citizenship are distributed equally regardless of who 
wields power.  Once the sovereign qualification thesis is denied, this equality allows 
individuals to focus on the gains that they will reap from a particular sovereign.  Both the 
self-preservation and freedom of the voter would be instantiated equally by all candidates 
– the former for the reasons just discussed and the latter because all subjects are equally 
(un)free.59  Therefore, voters who define worth as capacity to maximize their personal 
self-interest would prefer to be subjugated to whichever candidate would supply the 
greatest stock of material goods and glory to the voter herself.   
Employing this notion of worth causes a problem for the successive-election 
proposal.  An election with this conception of worth is more costly than alternative 
                                                             
58 There are perhaps other criteria that could be used for worth, but I believe that my objection will apply so 
long as one denies the sovereign qualification thesis. 
59 For a fascinating discussion of this claim and the context out of which it arose see Skinner (2008), 
especially chapter 5. 
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methods for selecting a monarch, but produces no benefits.  To see this, we must examine 
how such an election would unfold. 
What will an election in which voters aim to maximize their personal self-interest 
look like?  The strategy of voting for the friend or family member who one believes to 
have the best chance to win is likely to be applicable over several rounds of balloting.60  
The voter prefers to be subjugated to those closest to her because she may receive glory 
by association (L, X, 11; L, X, 50)61 and is more likely to receive gifts from friends and 
family members than strangers (L, XIX, 8).  If the voter does select an electable friend – 
one who appears to have a reasonable chance to become sovereign – then she will 
continue to vote for her friend.  However, a voter who was mistaken about the electability 
of a friend will shift her vote to a friend or family member who does appear to be 
electable.   
The strategy of voting for an electable friend or family member will diminish the 
number of feasible candidates for monarch, but is insufficient to supply an individual 
with majority support.  This is because commonwealths require a substantial number of 
citizens and no single individual is likely to be friends or family members with a majority 
of the population.  Therefore, though this strategy can narrow the field it is unable to pick 
the winner by itself. 
                                                             
60 Though Hampton suggests that everybody would initially vote for themselves, there are reasons to think 
that being sovereign is not entirely desirable (Sorell). 
61 Hobbes makes clear that power and honor are only derived from family as a societal norm and therefore 
whether one could derive glory – “joy arising from imagination of a man’s own power and ability” (L, VI, 
39) – from a family member is contingent on the norms of the particular society. 
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When a voter reaches the outer limits of those considered friends or family, no 
candidate has amassed majority support, and her final candidate is not among the top vote 
getters, the voter will choose to endorse an electable candidate from whom there is no 
prospect of gain rather than a friend who has no reasonable chance of winning.62  As 
more individuals vote based solely on electability and the number of candidates 
remaining lessens, the most popular candidate will draw more and more support from 
those shifting their vote from a friend to a stranger and eventually will receive the 
majority of support.  Having achieved the necessary threshold identified by Hobbes, the 
lone candidate will then be authorized as sovereign. 
Hampton’s successive-election proposal, interpreted such that voters prefer to be 
subjugated to whomever will maximize their personal self-interest, allows individuals to 
eventually coalesce around a single candidate by learning who has the biggest support 
base of friends and family amongst the candidates.  Though individuals begin by voting 
for the candidate from whom they believe they will receive the greatest personal gain, the 
only thing that we can know about the monarch eventually selected in this fashion is that 
she will have had a relatively large group of friends and family support her in the early 
stages of the election.   
 The successive-election proposal is able to eventually solve the monarch-selection 
problem by describing a process in which individuals vote for candidates based on the 
dual criteria of electability and worth.  Unfortunately, if we assume that the sovereign 
qualification thesis is false, this process is highly impractical.  Under this assumption, 
                                                             
62 This is because, as noted earlier, voters will prefer a candidate who is electable, but possesses no worth to 
a candidate who possesses worth, but is not electable. 
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contractors are better off employing a random lottery or series of coin flips than a series 
of elections.  These alternatives would select an equally effective monarch since, ex 
hypothesi, everybody is an equally effective monarch. However, the alternatives would 
do so more quickly and easily.63  Assuming the sovereign qualification is false, therefore, 
we can say that individuals would rather utilize a lottery or series of coin flips than an 
election. 
 If the qualifications of the monarch are irrelevant to the stability of the 
commonwealth and, subsequently, voters prefer to be subjugated to those whom they 
believe would maximize their personal self-interest, we come to the conclusion that a 
series of elections is an inferior method for selecting a monarch than a less discerning 
procedure such as a coin flip or a lottery.  If this were the sole interpretation of the 
successive-election proposal then we might rightly disregard Hampton’s plan for solving 
the monarch-selection problem.  However, doing so would be too quick because, as I will 
argue, the argument relies on a false premise.  That is, the qualifications of the sovereign 
do matter for the peace of the commonwealth.  This position provides an alternative 
interpretation of worth.  The preference is not driven solely by the desire for material 
goods and glory, but also the desire to be ruled by a qualified sovereign.64  First, I will 
explain why the argument against the sovereign qualification thesis fails before providing 
some textual evidence in support of the thesis. 
                                                             
63 For an argument in favor of lottery to solve the monarch-selection problem see Vanderschraaf. 
64 My use of “qualified” is not quite in the spirit of Hobbes.  He would have likely described a qualified 
candidate as worthy, fit, or possessing aptitude (L, X, 53). 
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Peters, Tuck, and Hardin all argued, in their own way, that Hobbes denied the 
sovereign qualification thesis.  Recall the argument against the sovereign qualification 
thesis that I sketched earlier: 
1) All (de jure) sovereigns possess absolute rights in matters pertaining to the peace 
of the commonwealth (L, XVIII).   
2) The private interest of a monarch dovetails with the public interest of the 
commonwealth (L, XIX, 4).   
3) Individuals act in their self-interest (L, VI, 49).   
4) All individuals are equally effective at fulfilling their desires. 
5) Therefore, any individual who was monarch would act in the interest of the 
commonwealth to the same degree as any other individual in that position. 
 
And yet, there are several instances where Hobbes indicates possible failings of 
sovereigns, including absolute monarchs.  For example, punishing innocent citizens or 
failure to teach citizens the grounds of political obligation lead to less stable states and 
increase the possibility of rebellion and a return to the state of nature (L, XXVIII, 22; L, 
XXX, 4).  In these comments Hobbes never cites an imperfect structure of sovereignty 
(i.e. a departure from absolute monarchy) as the cause.  On the contrary, he sometimes 
even explicitly notes that an absolute sovereign is capable of error.  In discussing why the 
sovereign may fail to teach the proper doctrines Hobbes writes, “there is no difficulty 
(whilst a sovereign has his power entire) but what proceeds from his own fault, or the 
fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the commonwealth…” (L, XXX, 
6, my emphasis). This is the clearest example of a sovereign endangering the safety of the 
commonwealth despite the commonwealth having the proper form.  These instances 
reveal that the choices of the sovereign, and not just the structure of sovereignty, are 
relevant to the well-being of the commonwealth.  
32 
 
 
 
 The denier of the sovereign qualification thesis can admit the possibility of 
sovereign error, even by an absolute monarch, so long as they also hold that no particular 
individual is more prone to error than any other.  However, Hobbes makes this latter 
proposition difficult to maintain. 
I am at the point of believing this my labour as useless as the commonwealth of 
Plato.  For he also is of opinion that it is impossible for the disorder of state, and 
change of governments by civil war, ever to be taken away, till sovereigns be 
philosophers. 
But when I consider again…that neither Plato, nor any other philosopher 
hitherto, hath put in order, and sufficiently or probably, proved all the theorems of 
moral doctrine, that men may learn thereby both how to govern and how to obey; 
I recover some hope that, one time or other, this writing of mine may fall into the 
hands of a sovereign who will consider it himself (for it is short, and I think 
clear), without the help of any interested or envious interpreter, and by the 
exercise of entire sovereignty in protecting the public teaching of it, convert this 
truth of speculation into the utility of practice (L, XXXI, 41). 
 
Though the differences between Hobbes’ and Plato’s doctrine are not inconsequential,65 I 
want to focus on what Hobbes himself sees as a similarity – i.e. “it is impossible for the 
disorder of the state, and change of governments by civil war, ever to be taken away, till 
sovereigns be philosophers” (my emphasis).  This claim, when combined with the other 
evidence, strongly suggests that Hobbes held that the qualifications of the sovereign ARE 
important for the safety of the commonwealth.66   
                                                             
65 One may worry that the claims of the second paragraph contradict the sovereign qualification thesis.  
However, by admitting that reading Leviathan is beneficial to a sovereign, Hobbes is confirming that at 
least one qualification is relevant to a sovereign’s ability to maintain a peaceful commonwealth. There is an 
unexplored divide between those who think there are minimal qualifications to be an effective sovereign 
and those who claim that are robust qualifications.  For examples of the latter see footnote 66.  For the 
former see footnote 68.  I believe there are robust requirements, but that is a position that I am not able to 
defend in this paper. 
66 I am not alone in holding that the qualifications of the sovereign are important.  See Mara 391 and 
395; Sreedhar (2010) 80. 
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There is significant textual evidence to indicate that Hobbes affirmed the 
sovereign qualification thesis.  So, where did the natural reading that indicated otherwise 
go wrong?  First, against the second premise, though it may be true for most individuals 
that their narrow self-interests as monarch would dovetail with the safety of the 
commonwealth, this is not necessarily true for all individuals.  For example, an individual 
who desires glory over self-preservation and seeks glory through conquest may place the 
safety of the commonwealth in danger.67  Second, individuals do not necessarily act in 
their (perceived) self-interest and therefore even if they did value self-preservation above 
all else the mere presence of a desire for glory or material goods could lead to a foolish 
and ultimately destructive policy.  Finally, the argument misinterprets Hobbesian equality 
in the fourth premise.  Hobbes only asserts that all individuals are susceptible to death 
and that all individuals believe that they are equally or more intelligent than everybody 
else (L, XIII, 1-2).  This does not exclude the possibility of any of the inequalities to 
which I have drawn attention, many of which are explicitly acknowledged by Hobbes.  
Specifically, not all individuals would necessarily have equal knowledge or reasoning 
ability (L, XXV, 13; DC, XIV, 19).68  These differences could affect the policies that a 
monarch would select in an effort to achieve peace, with some being more likely to 
preserve peace than others.  There is thus significant evidence to indicate that Hobbes 
held the sovereign qualification thesis. 
                                                             
67 For a fascinating study of the role of “transcendent interests” that override the desire for self-preservation 
in Hobbes’ philosophy see Lloyd. 
68 See Okin and Skinner (1965). 
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Does Hampton’s successive-election proposal fare better when the truth of the 
sovereign qualification thesis is affirmed?  First, we must re-examine how an election 
would unfold.  Under the assumption that the sovereign qualification thesis is false, worth 
is based on which candidate can promote a voter’s personal self-interest.  This leads 
voters to endorse friends or family members who they believe have the best chance to 
win.  However, since it is highly unlikely that one individual will be the friend or family 
member of a majority of the voters constituting the commonwealth, eventually most 
individuals will shift their support to a more popular stranger.  Yet, these strangers will 
be popular precisely because they had a large initial base of friends and family.  
Therefore, whoever wins the election will be somebody who had a large number of 
family and friends who believed that this person would garner substantial support. 
How does the process change if voters accept the sovereign qualification thesis?  
Voters will determine worth by a candidate’s perceived qualifications and not her ability 
to provide the voter with material goods and glory.  This is because an unqualified friend 
or family member who becomes sovereign is more harmful than helpful to a voter.  
Though a voter may receive some personal favors from the sovereign, this cannot 
outweigh the costs of the commonwealth decaying into the state of war due to 
incompetent leadership.69 
                                                             
69 It may be thought that incompetent leadership will simply eventually fail and be replaced by a qualified.  
Hobbes warns against thinking by citing “the foolish daughters of Peleus (in the fable) which, desiring to 
renew the youth of their decrepit father, did by the counsel of Medea cut him in pieces and boil him, 
together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new man” (L, XXX, 7).  In short, dissolving a 
government in hopes of receiving a better one may result in no government at all.  
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The successive-election process will look remarkably similar in spite of our 
altered conception of worth.  A voter will begin by endorsing a candidate who she 
believes possesses both worth and electability.  She will either be right or wrong about 
the latter.  If right, she will continue to endorse this candidate.  If wrong, she will select 
another candidate who she believes possesses worth, but has more support. 
It is important to realize that voters’ beliefs are significantly constrained by their 
experience: A voter cannot believe an individual to be qualified if she does not know 
anything about that individual.  Therefore, like the finite circle of friends and family in 
the previous iteration, a voter’s list of candidates who she believes to possess worth will 
be limited due to her interactions in the state of nature.  Since it is unlikely that any 
individual will have interacted with more than half the population, let alone be viewed as 
possessing worth by that number, it is unlikely that an individual will receive sufficient 
support so long as everybody is voting for candidates who they believe possess both 
worth and electability.70  It is at this point that voters will begin to support candidates 
who they believe possess electability but not worth.  Again, we will see the candidates 
with the most support continue to gather more and more, eventually leading to a 
candidate securing majority support and being authorized sovereign. 
When the sovereign qualification thesis is affirmed and worth is based on an 
individual’s perceived qualifications, we can see that receiving strong support in the 
initial rounds of voting is required to become sovereign, just as it was in the election 
                                                             
70 Perhaps if the state of nature continued long enough this would not be true, but at some point 
commonwealth by institution and commonwealth by acquisition lose any significant distinction, thus 
turning two theoretical tools of Hobbes into only one. 
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process in which worth was determined by a voter’s personal self-interest.  However, 
rather than the eventual winner’s early support coming from those hoping to maximize 
their personal self-interest, it will be from individuals who believe she is a qualified 
candidate.  This change shows that an election is capable of producing a benefit that is far 
from guaranteed through coin-flip or lottery.  The eventual monarch will be perceived to 
be qualified to run a commonwealth by the people with whom she has interacted.  Given 
that individuals are attempting to create “perpetual…security” (L, XIX, 15), this would 
seem to be a significant disadvantage of a lottery when compared to an election process 
where individuals take into account their opinions about who is and is not qualified to be 
absolute monarch. 
I have just argued that a plausible solution to the monarch-selection problem is to 
identify a sovereign via a series of elections and that the winner of these elections will 
have been viewed by many of those that knew her to be a qualified candidate for 
sovereign.  What, if anything, follows from this conclusion?  First, we cannot conclude 
that the winner of the election at the conclusion of our state of nature thought 
experiment71 would be the best choice for sovereign.  This is because the thought 
experiment began with individuals stripped not only of their ties to one another, but also 
their prudential and scientific knowledge.72  Though individuals gain knowledge as the 
thought experiment progresses, it is not necessarily the knowledge that they possess in 
                                                             
71 Assuming the completion of such an elaborate thought experiment possible. 
72 One could run the thought experiment differently and allow individuals to retain all traits that have an 
effect on their ability to rule.  However, as I earlier posited, this does not seem to be Hobbes’ intention and 
certainly seems a far cry from his project. 
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reality.73  If we cannot conclude that the individual who would be elected as sovereign 
from the state of nature would make a good sovereign can we conclude anything at all?  I 
think we can so long as we focus not on who was selected, but rather that the voters 
selected the winner based on their perceived ability to govern the commonwealth.  This 
seems to make it possible to say that there are good and bad sovereigns and their 
goodness or badness as sovereigns is linked to whether they are qualified to govern a 
State.74 
One might object that even if it is true that there are better and worse sovereigns 
that this is a claim that Hobbes would not want citizens to focus on or even be cognizant 
of. To be clear, this is a practical and not theoretical objection.  It is not that my claim is 
false, but that it is potentially destabilizing to States (L, XVII, 9; L, XXIX, 13).  I agree 
that Hobbes does not desire a State where citizens are constantly judging the ability of 
their rulers to govern.  However, we should not assume that Hobbes was only speaking to 
individuals who were inhabitants of States.  For example, while he was composing 
Leviathan, England was in a civil war and, according to Hobbes, a state of nature.75  That 
would mean the English people were charged with selecting new leaders and the view 
                                                             
73 Hobbes makes clear that prudential and scientific knowledge are both helpful in governing a State (L, 
XXV, 13).  However, one would retain some traits that do affect one’s ability to govern - e.g. passions (L, 
XIX, 4) and mental acuity (L, VIII, 2). 
74 Whatever the status of this claim is, it appears to be analogous to Hobbes’ claim that monarchy is the 
best form of sovereignty.  However, there is substantial disagreement in the literature as to what exactly the 
status of that claim is.  Some scholars suggest that Hobbes’ advocacy of monarchy is on a par with his 
support of undivided sovereignty (Hampton 105-8; Lloyd 293-5) whereas others attempt to minimize the 
claim as trivial (Tuck [2006]).  I think in reality it falls somewhere between those two extremes. 
75 Hobbes (1839) 29. 
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that they should endorse who they thought was qualified rather than leaving it up to luck 
or merely endorsing the most powerful individual is not an inconsequential insight.76   
Thomas Hobbes’ truncated description of commonwealth by institution fails to 
sufficiently describe the process of selecting the sovereign.  In an attempt to fill that 
lacuna, Jean Hampton proposes a series of elections in which individuals vote based on 
worth and electability.  The success of such a proposal depends on whether or not Hobbes 
accepts the sovereign qualification thesis.  I argue that he does and therefore a series of 
successive elections provides a benefit not produced by a coin-flip or lottery.  I have 
intimated that if this is the best solution to the monarch-selection problem then we have 
learned that there are good and bad sovereigns and their goodness and badness is related 
to their ability to successfully govern a commonwealth.  However, there is a lot more 
work to do both in identifying what traits one must possess in order to successfully 
govern a commonwealth and in more clearly defining the normative status of being a 
good or bad sovereign. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
76 One way to determine the qualifications of a leader is how closely their espoused position was to the 
policy that is best for the State.  Jeffrey Collins has suggested that Hobbes’ return to England following his 
exile was related to the similarity of his and Cromwell’s views on religion.  See Collins, especially chapter 
5.  Especially illuminating is this passage: “Hobbes returned to England in 1651 because, with the war 
over, the King dead, and the Presbyterians fallen from grace, he saw an opportunity to achieve a political 
settlement that accorded with his own principles.  The Stuart cause had been undermined by the combined 
efforts of its Laudian and later Presbyterian allies, but the newly dominant Independents promised to 
constitute a regime along Erastian lines.  Cromwell in particular may well have appealed to Hobbes as a 
sovereign potentially true to Leviathan’s ideal” (157-8). 
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